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PURSUING A UNIVERSAL THRESHOLD
FOR REGULATING INCITEMENT TO
DISCRIMINATION, HOSTILITY OR
VIOLENCE
INTRODUCTION
rticle 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR)
1
provides that “any advocacy of na-
tional, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”
2
Criminalizing hate speech is one of the few permissible limita-
tions on freedom of expression under the ICCPR. Unfortunately,
the lack of a universally accepted threshold for determining
what constitutes incitement has produced inconsistent and con-
tradictory results that vary from country to country.
3
On the one
hand, some countries, including the United States, have strong
traditions of freedom of expression and only criminalize incite-
ment when it is likely to result in imminent violence.
4
In the
United States the First Amendment protects even the most in-
flammatory speech.
5
On the other hand, some countries admin-
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See infra Part I.B.2.
2. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20. The ICCPR does not say that criminaliza-
tion is the only method for punishing speech likely to incite discrimination,
hostility or violence. Article 20(2) only says that this type of speech “shall be
prohibited by law.” Id. This Note focuses primarily on speech that rises to such
a severe level that criminalization is appropriate.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. Adam Liptak, Hate Speech or Free Speech? What Much of West Bans is
Protected in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2008), http://www.ny-
times.com/2008/06/11/world/americas/11iht-hate.4.13645369.html?mcubz=0.
To be clear, the United States has made a reservation to Article 20(2), so it
does not implement its prohibitions. United States Government Response to the
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Concerning
Expert Workshops on Incitement to National, Racial, or Religious Hatred, Dip-
lomatic Note 2, U.S. DEP’T. ST. (Nov. 3, 2010), available at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/179250.pdf. The purported rea-
son is that Article 20(2) would limit the rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. See id. The United States does recognize, however, the offense of incite-
ment under its common law, so it still serves as a useful comparator when
A
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ister the offense of incitement in an abusive manner; such coun-
tries adopt domestic laws that purport to criminalize hateful or
violent speech, but that instead punish journalists and govern-
ment critics.
6
In 2012, the human rights advocacy organization, ARTICLE
19,
7
acknowledged the disconnect between Article 20’s purpose
and application.
8
It published a policy brief on issues related to
identifying incitement and administering punishments for the
offense.
9
ARTICLE 19 proposed, inter alia, uniform legislation
and a glossary of key terms related to the offense of incitement
for use by courts.
10
The organization also suggested a six-factor
test for courts to apply when adjudicating incitement cases.
11
The test called upon courts to strictly scrutinize:
[the] context of the expression; speaker/proponent of the ex-
pression; intent of the speaker/proponent of the expression to
incite to discrimination, hostility or violence; content of the ex-
pression; extent and magnitude of the expression (including its
public nature, its audience and means of dissemination); [and]
likelihood of the advocated action occurring, including its im-
minence.
12
discussing the extreme dichotomy between enforcement and non-enforcement
of incitement and related consequences. See infra Part II.A.
6. Ethiopia is one example. Aaron Maasho, Ethiopian Court Convicts Jour-
nalist for Incitement of Violence, REUTERS (May 24, 2017), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-ethiopia-journalist/ethiopian-court-convicts-journalist-for-
incitement-of-violence-idUSKBN18K24G.
7. ARTICLE 19 is a United Kingdom-based organization that champion’s
issues related to free expression. See About Us, ARTICLE 19, https://www.ar-
ticle19.org/about-us/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
8. See Prohibiting Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence,
ARTICLE 19 1, 1 (Dec. 2012), https://www.article19.org/data/files/mediali-
brary/3548/ARTICLE-19-policy-on-prohibition-to-incitement.pdf [hereinafter
Prohibiting Incitement].
9. See id. The ARTICLE 19 framework appears to build off of an earlier
legal study it conducted for a “regional expert meeting on [A]rticle 20” hosted
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. See BARBARA
BUKOVSKA, AGNESCALLAMARD&SEJAL PARRMER, TOWARDS AN INTERPRETATION
OFARTICLE 20 OF THE ICCPR: THRESHOLDS FOR THE PROHIBITION OF INCITEMENT
TO HATRED 5 (2010), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Ex-
pression/ICCPR/Vienna/CRP7Callamard.pdf.
10. See id. at 2.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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The policy brief provides a comprehensive framework for eval-
uating incitement cases; however, the paper is not binding on
states or courts, both of which are free to and, indeed, do ignore
the recommended framework.
13
As a result of courts and legisla-
tures’ inattention to problems related to the offense of incite-
ment, issues surrounding its criminalization persist.
14
States across the international community are violating the
fundamental purpose of Article 20(2),
15
to punish hate speech,
either by using it as a tool to restrict non-inciting expression or
by using freedom of expression as a guise for non-enforcement.
16
Such misuse of Article 20 can be remedied by a universal stand-
ard for the criminalization of incitement that promotes safety
and protects individual rights and reputations, yet also safe-
guards free speech.
This Note will demonstrate the pressing need for a universal
solution to this problem despite the growing number of obstacles
to achieving uniformity. Part I will emphasize the need for gov-
ernments to punish and deter acts of criminal incitement. It will
also provide a history of regulatory efforts at the global level.
Part II will illustrate the inconsistency in regulatory efforts
among different states by contrasting the inattention to incite-
ment in the United States with other countries who abuse Arti-
cle 20(2), using it to silence dissent. Part III will describe chal-
lenges to regulating incitement, including limitations that may
13. The framework is also problematic for a number of reasons, so states
and courts should not adopt it anyway. See infra Part IV.B.
14. Although many states have regulations for incitement, they often do not
revisit them to ensure the enacted statutes are effectively grappling with the
problem. See Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National,
Racial or Religious Hatred That Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hos-
tility or Violence, OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS. 1, 7²8 (2012) [hereinafter Ra-
bat]. Further, provisions prohibiting incitement in different countries are dis-
similar, some being too restrictive and others being too permissive. Id. Tomake
matters worse, there is limited judicial precedent to standardize the field. Id.
Often times when incitement has been prosecuted, it was done to affect a spe-
cific purpose not necessarily related to the underlying purpose of punishing
inciting speech. Id. Additionally, the age of the Internet is presenting novel
problems to regulating incitement. See generally Incitement to Hatred vs. Free-
dom of Expression: Challenges of Combating Hate Crimes Motivated by Hate
on the Internet, OFF. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS HUM. RTS. 1 (Mar. 22, 2010),
http://www.osce.org/odihr/68750?download=true [hereinafter Hate on the In-
ternet]. See infra Part III.B for further discussion of this issue.
15. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
16. See Rabat, supra note 14, at 2.
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prevent international bodies from effecting global change. It will
also discuss the challenges to the consistent application of crim-
inal incitement laws that the Internet presents. Part IV will
evaluate solutions proffered by other scholars, focusing on
ARTICLE 19’s robust treatment of the issue and its solution. Fi-
nally, Part V will propose that a global standard, in lieu of a
strict rule, will be the most effective means for achieving con-
stancy in regulation. In doing so, this Note will elaborate on the
analytical steps necessary to determine a regulatory standard.
Delineating such a standard demands awareness of instances of
inappropriate criminalization of incitement in order to clarify a
threshold that comports with basic principles of freedom of ex-
pression. This proposal endeavors to strike a careful balance be-
tween the peremptory right of international citizens to true free-
dom of expression and the undeniable need to criminalize incit-
ing speech in instances that endanger human rights and global
safety.
I. A GLOBALHISTORY OF INCITING SPEECH
This Part will display the true necessity of having laws that
criminalize speech likely to incite “discrimination, hostility, or
violence”
17
using historic and present-day examples. It will then
address past attempts to regulate such speech, culminating with
the ratification of the ICCPR, andmore specifically, Article 20(2)
of that document.
18
A. A Demonstrated Need for Laws Criminalizing Incitement
Dehumanization is a tool that helps leaders portray certain so-
cietal groups as enemies, thereby making it seem “necessary” to
commit “atrocities . . . as a form of collective self-defense.”
19
This
is precisely what Adolf Hitler and his followers did in Nazi Ger-
many through an extensive propaganda campaign advocating
racial purity.
20
Hitler used his political platform and various
17. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
18. Id.
19. Barrett Holmes Pitner, Dangerous Speech is Not Free Speech or Even
Hate Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (May, 18, 2015), https://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/barrett-holmes-pitner/dangerous-speech-is-not-f_b_6890456.html
(internal citations omitted).
20. See generally Nazi Racism, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM,
https://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007679 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2017).
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forms of mass communication to convince Germans that Jewish
people were “racial enemies” and should be excluded from the
nation.
21
The propaganda was critical in convincing people to
both carry out the mass murders and to stand by in “acquies-
cence.”
22
Years after the Nazi German atrocities, the radio especially
played a critical and eerily similar role in the Rwandan Geno-
cide.
23
Private radio stations led by Hutu extremists urged a ¶“fi-
nal war’ to ¶exterminate the cockroaches’” and gave information
about where to find and kill members of the Tutsi population in
hiding.
24
The propaganda had such a startling effect on the
Rwandan people that some husbands of Tutsi women killed their
own wives for fear that if they did not, they themselves would be
killed.
25
Some priests and nuns were convicted of slaughtering
Tutsis who came to churches for shelter and safety.
26
Clearly, this type of speech can be immensely powerful and
persuasive, and therefore, cannot be left unregulated. Consider,
especially, that decades after the horrors committed against
21. See id. After Hitler took power in Germany, he created a new propa-
ganda ministry in the government whose sole purpose was to make sure that
anti-Semitic messages were disseminated to the general public. Nazi Propa-
ganda, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM,
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005202 (last visited
Oct. 20, 2017). This propaganda came in many forms including in art, music,
theatre, films, books, radio, educational materials and the press. Id. Films, es-
pecially, were used to portray Jewish people as enemies. Id. Movies depicted
an idealized vision of success for Germany under the Nazi regime and con-
trasted that with a corrupted life for Germans sharing a society with Jewish
persons. Id. These messages became more overt over time, eventually calling
for support from the German people for total removal of all Jewish persons
from German lands. Id.
22. Id.
23. Rwanda long suffered ethnic tensions between the Hutu majority and
the Tutsi minority. See Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days of Slaughter, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506 [hereinafter
Rwanda Genocide]. In 1994, a plane carrying the then Rwandan president, a
Hutu, was shot down, killing the passengers, and many Hutus blamed Tutsi
rebels for the attack. Id. Subsequently, the Hutus began systemically killing
Tutsis. Id. In the end, approximately 800,000 people were killed. Id.
24. Russel Smith, The Impact of Hate Media in Rwanda, BBC NEWS (Dec.
3, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3257748.stm.
25. See Rwanda Genocide, supra note 23.
26. See id.
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Jews in Germany, anti-Semitism persists.
27
This mentality ex-
tends far beyond the bounds of anti-Semitism.
28
The propaganda
employed by the Nazi regime was so influential that it has be-
come a “timeless” symbol for hate groups who regularly apply
Nazi phrases and techniques to their own repulsive ideologies.
29
For example, in 2017, in Charlottesville, Virginia, a white su-
premacist demonstration largely targeted black minorities in
the United States; yet, the participants displayed banners with
swastikas, wore shirts referencing Hitler, and shouted Nazi
phrases.
30
Different forms of racial, ethnic, religious, and other insensi-
tivities still run rampant.
31
On a smaller scale, instances of
speech intended to incite discrimination, hostility, or violence
are still heavily reported in the news across many countries
worldwide.
32
For example, in 2017 an Iraqi refugee, and ISIS
27. See Yair Rosenberg, Five Myths About Anti-Semitism, WASH. POST (Feb.
3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-anti-
semitism/2017/02/03/a8de59e2-e884-11e6-b82f-
687d6e6a3e7c_story.html?utm_term=.91e7b236c3b4. “The end of Nazism as a
dominant political force did not silence anti-Semitism.” Id. Jewish persons are
still targets of hate crimes all over the world; in the United States, they are
annually the target of the most hate crimes against any religious group. Id.
Further, in 2013, a survey conducted by the European Union revealed that
almost 40 percent of Jewish persons in Europe feared to identify as such. Id.
Similar anti-Semitic attitudes linger in non-Western states as well, where
Jews have been persecuted to such an extent that they were forced to flee;
whereas Arab countries used to be home to over 1 million Jewish persons, that
number has fallen to just the thousands. Id.
28. See Emma Green,Why the Charlottesville Marchers Were Obsessed with
Jews, ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2017/08/nazis-racism-charlottesville/536928/. “Anti-Semitism often func-
tions as a readily available language for all manner of bigotry³a Rosetta Stone
that can translate animus toward one group into a universal hate for many
groups.” Id. Other symbolisms, including Ku Klux Klan symbols, are also dis-
played at riots, such as the one in Charlottesville. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Meetings Coverage, General Assembly, Amid Rising Xenophobia,
Violence, States Must Do More to Protect Migrants’ Rights, General Assembly
Hears on International Day for Ending Racial Discrimination, U.N. Meetings
Coverage GA/111895 (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/ga11895.doc.htm.
32. See id.
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sympathizer, living in a shelter in Italy was arrested for spread-
ing inciting “news and materials of the Islamic State.”
33
Alt-
hough these beliefs were not necessarily representative of Islam,
he claimed that those who do not follow Islam “should have their
throats cut,” and he tried to recruit other Iraqis living in the
shelter to commit violent, terroristic acts.
34
At around the same
time in Switzerland, an Ethiopian imam was finally charged af-
ter months of Swiss officials investigating his mosque because of
suspicion that violent messages were being disseminated
there.
35
The imamwas allegedly encouraging his followers to kill
Muslims in the community who did not pray by burning them or
by killing them in their homes, as well as using Facebook to post
content of vicious murders.
36
There are countless additional ex-
amples of hate speech intended to cause violence, and just as it
has been a powerful tool in perpetrating violence in the past, so
is it today.
37
Without taking appropriate steps to regulate speech
33. Italy Arrests Asylum Seeker for Inciting Terrorism, REUTERS (June 19,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-security/italy-arrests-asylum-
seeker-for-inciting-terrorism-idUSKBN19A0Y6.
34. See id.
35. See Michael Shields, Swiss Charge Ethiopian Imam with Inciting Vio-
lence, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-
imam/swiss-charge-ethiopian-imam-with-inciting-violence-
idUSKBN1AR0Q4.
36. See id.
37. The owner of a store called “Hitler 2” on the Gaza Strip displayed a man-
nequin out front holding a knife and wearing a shirt that said “stab,” which he
said was intended to encourage Palestinians to attack Israelis with knives.
Luke Baker, In Gaza and Israel, Danger of Incitement to Violence Lurks,
REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestini-
ans-incitement/in-gaza-and-israel-danger-of-incitement-to-violence-lurks-
idUSKCN0SU2BM20151105. Some Palestinians use Facebook to spread mes-
sages like “Death to the Jews” and “Slaughter the Jews.” Steven Scheer, Social
Media Heeding Most Israeli Calls to Delete Incitement’: Minister, REUTERS
(Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-socialmedia/social-
media-heeding-most-israeli-calls-to-delete-incitement-minister-
idUSKCN11I247. “Every 71 seconds there is an inciting post uploaded against
Palestinians.” 7amleh Releases New Racism Index Exposing Heightened Israeli
Online Incitement Against Palestinians, 7AMLEH (Mar. 5, 2018), http://7am-
leh.org/2018/03/05/7amleh-releases-new-racism-index-exposing-heightened-
israeli-online-incitement-against-palestinians/. “One out of nine posts about
Palestinians contains a call for violence or a curse.” Id. In Myanmar, the mili-
tary murdered and gang raped Muslim Rohingya with “genocidal intent,” and
investigators blamed Facebook and others for allowing inciting content on its
platform. Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Calls for Myanmar Generals to be Tried for
Genocide, Blames Facebook for Incitement, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2018),
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that rises to such a level that it poses a threat to human rights,
personal safety and national security, society is vulnerable to the
repetition of past horrors.
B. Attempts to Regulate Provocative Speech on a Global Scale
38
This Part will discuss past efforts, namely the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/un-calls-for-myan-
mar-generals-to-be-tried-for-genocide-blames-facebook-for-incitement-
idUSKCN1LC0KN. A retired professor in Singapore was sentenced to three
months imprisonment for posting on a nationalist social media page that a
“vigilante group” in the country should beat up Caucasians in bars to teach
them a lesson. Elena Chong, Retired Lecturer Jailed for Inciting Violence,
STRAITS TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/retired-
lecturer-jailed-for-inciting-violence. The professor started the nationalist page,
“Act for Singapore,” himself after he became displeased with the increased
number of foreigners in Singapore compared to a declining number of Singa-
porean natives. Id.
38. There have also been regional efforts to regulate inciting speech. For
example, the European Convention on Human Rights has loosely recognized
the concept of incitement. See infra Part III.A.1 for further discussion on this
point. Additionally, the American Convention on Human Rights contains the
following provision:
Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial,
or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless vi-
olence or to any other similar action against any person or
group of persons on any grounds including those of race,
color, religion, language, or national origin shall be consid-
ered as offenses punishable by law.
American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-32)
art. 46(1)(a), July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm.
Another major regional human rights treaty, The African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights “does not deal directly with the prohibition of incitement
and there are no provisions regarding incitement in the African Charter simi-
lar to those in Article 20(2) of the ICCPR.” See Prohibiting Incitement, supra
note 8, at 16²17. In the landmark 2015 case, Lohé Issa Konaté v. The Republic
of Burkina Faso, however, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACtHPR) “directly considered the right to freedom of expression, and the va-
lidity of legislation that criminalizes defamation” for the first time in their
eight years of existence. Criminalising Speech in Africa: What Did the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights Actually Say About Defamation Laws,
MEDIABELF, https://mediabelf.wordpress.com/2015/01/16/criminalising-
speech-in-africa-what-did-the-african-court-on-human-and-peoples-rights-ac-
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ICCPR, undertaken by the global community as a whole to reg-
ulate speech that rises to the level of incitement. Further, this
Part will specifically discuss ICCPR Article 20(2),
39
which im-
poses an affirmative obligation on states to prohibit inciting
speech.
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
In 1948, following the human rights violations committed dur-
ing World War II, the United Nations adopted the UDHR, which
pledged certain fundamental rights to all individuals in the
global community.
40
Unfortunately, the UDHR was not adopted
in such a way as to render it a binding legal document, and the
United Nations General Assembly recognized that its contents
needed to be reduced to treaties.
41
While the UDHR was ground-
breaking in international human rights law, it initially served
merely as a political proclamation that certain civil and political
tually-say-about-defamation-law/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (unofficial trans-
lation). The ACtHPR gave noteworthy credence to laws prohibiting incitement
and to the ICCPR, saying:
Apart from serious and very exceptional circumstances for ex-
ample, defence of international crimes, public incitement to
hatred, discrimination or violence or threats of violence
against a person or a group of people, because of specific cri-
teria such as race, colour, religion or nationality, the Court is
of the view that the violations of laws on freedom of speech
and the press cannot be sanctioned by custodial sentences,
without going contrary to [the African Charter and the
ICCPR].
Id. (emphasis added).
39. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
40. See History of the Document, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/sections/uni-
versal-declaration/history-document/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). Af-
ter World War II, some United Nations Member States sought to incorporate
a human rights code into the United Nations Charter (“the Charter”). See
Christian Tomuschat, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
U.N., http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/iccpr/iccpr.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). It
was not possible at the time because of the extensive preparation needed to
incorporate such a code, but the Charter did ultimately contain references to
human rights in the Preamble and a variety of provisions. See id. Once the
Charter was ratified, and the institutional framework for the United Nations
was set, a human rights commission began working on human rights docu-
ments, first of which was the UDHR. See id.
41. See Tomuschat, supra note 40.
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freedoms were too important to subject them to state govern-
ment regulation.
42
One of these fundamental principles dealt with inciting
speech.
43
Article 7 of the UDHR states that “[a]ll are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimina-
tion.”
44
Recognition of the need to regulate inciting speech was
hugely important, but more persuasive legal authority would be
necessary to effectively protect society from those members who
promote hateful expression.
45
2. Inception of the ICCPR
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the ICCPR,
and it came into force on March 23, 1976.
46
This document, the
UDHR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) comprise the International Bill of
Rights.
47
The ICCPR gives binding force to many of the civil and
42. See id.
43. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec.
10, 1948). See, e.g., civil rights enshrined in, inter alia, Article 3 (“Everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person.”), Article 4 (“No one shall be
held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in
all their forms.”), Article 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). Id. See, e.g., political rights
enshrined in, inter alia, Article 15 (“(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to change his nationality.”) and Article 20 (“(1) Everyone has the right to free-
dom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be compelled to be-
long to an association.”). Id.
44. Id.
45. See Tomuschat, supra note 40.
46. See Summary: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), CANADIAN C.L. ASS’N (Oct. 27, 2015), https://ccla.org/summary-inter-
national-covenant-on-civil-and-political-rights-iccpr/.
47. See id. The International Bill of Rights is the term for the collection of
human rights documents drafted by the United Nations (the UDHR, ICCPR,
and ICESCR). See Tomuschat, supra note 40. The ICESCR covers economic,
social and cultural rights, which the United Nations General Assembly consid-
ered were independent of the civil and political rights set out in the ICCPR.
See id.Western nations particularly advocated for separation of the documents
into two distinct covenants, reasoning that civil and political rights had to be
“respected strictly and without any reservations” whereas economic, social and
cultural rights were goals to be achieved, rather than strict rules of the game.
Id. This view of divided documents ultimately prevailed, but interestingly,
many nations have made reservations to the ICCPR, seeming to undermine
320 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:1
political values initially introduced in the UDHR. States who
have ratified the ICCPR are bound to “protect and preserve basic
human rights . . . [and] compelled to take administrative, judi-
cial, and legislative measures in order to protect the rights en-
shrined in the treaty and to provide an effective remedy.”
48
To-
day, there are seventy-four signatories to the ICCPR, and 172
states have ratified it.
49
3. Article 20(2): A ¶Prohibition’
The main hallmark of Article 20 is that it imposes an affirma-
tive obligation on states to prohibit the conduct enumerated
therein, including incitement.
50
This provision is closely related
the stated reasons for separation. Id. For a list of state signatories and state
reservations, please visit: Chapter IV Human Rights: International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Aug. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Chapter IV
Human Rights].
48. Id.
49. See Chapter IV Human Rights, supra note 47. Some ratifying parties did
so taking reservations to certain provisions. See id. Reservations are some-
times also referred to as “declarations” or “understandings,” or collectively
called “RUD’s.” See Reservations, Declarations & Understandings, EMORY L.,
http://guide.library.law.emory.edu/treaties_reservations (last visited Oct. 21,
2017). When a State party signs or ratifies a treaty, they may, unless expressly
forbidden with regard to the treaty at issue, make a reservation which negates
the legal effect of a specific provision with respect to the reserving state. Id. In
other words, if a state makes a reservation about a certain provision in the
treaty, they are alleging that it does not apply to them. See Reservations, Un-
derstandings, and Declarations, B.C. L. LIBR., http://law-
guides.bc.edu/c.php?g=350921&p=2367411 (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). States
may also assert an understanding or a declaration about what they believe to
be the meaning of a certain part of the treaty that may be ambiguous on its
face. Id. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties discusses these RUD’s
in Article 19 and notes importantly that none of these can be made if they are
incompatible with the treaty’s object and purpose. See Reservations, Declara-
tions & Understandings, supra.
50. See id.; see U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r on Hum. Rts. [OHCHR], Gen-
eral Comment No. 11: Prohibition of Propaganda for War and Inciting Na-
tional, Racial or Religious Hatred (Art. 20), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/11 (July
29, 1983), available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opin-
ion/CCPRGeneralCommentNo11.pdf [hereinafter Prohibition of Propaganda];
see U.N. OHCHR, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion
and Expression, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf [hereinafter Free-
doms of Opinion and Expression]. Most other provisions of the ICCPR do not
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to Article 19, which guarantees the right to freedom of expres-
sion.
51
Under the ICCPR, the right to freedom of expression is so
significant that it should never be restricted, except in extreme
circumstances.
52
The prohibitions of Article 20 are one of the
only permissible limitations on expression.
53
Article 19(3) enu-
merates the other circumstances, in which it is possible to limit
expression, and it lays out a strict test that any Article 19 or 20
restriction on freedom of expressionmust meet.
54
Under the test,
the restriction is permissible if it is: (1) provided by law; (2) pur-
sues a legitimate aim; and (3) is necessary in a democratic soci-
ety.
55
impose such an affirmative obligation on states. U.N. OHCHR, General Com-
ment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on State Parties to the
Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (Mar. 29, 2004), available
at www.unhcr.org/4963237716.pdf. Generally, the rest of the document calls
upon states to “respect and ensure the rights laid down in the [ICCPR] to any-
one within the power or effective control of that State Party.” Id.
51. See Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, supra note 50, ¶ 50; see
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19. ICCPR Article 19 states:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without in-
terference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of ex-
pression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice. (3) The exercise of
the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as
are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the
rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of na-
tional security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
Id.
52. See Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, supra note 50, ¶ 49.
53. See id.; see ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
54. See Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, supra note 50, ¶ 50; see
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19; see ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20. For example,
freedom of expression can be limited to protect “the rights or reputations of
others; [and] for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public) or of public health or morals.” See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19.
55. See Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, supra note 50, ¶ 49; see
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19; see infra Part V.A for further discussion on this
point.
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Article 20(2) specifically states that “any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrim-
ination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”
56
In
light of the restrictions imposed on this provision by Article 19,
it is important to realize that speech does not often rise to the
level of incitement.
57
When it does reach that level, however, it
is so threatening to society and to the values in Article 19(3)
58
that the ICCPR has obligated states to take appropriate legisla-
tive measures to suppress the inciting speech.
59
II. DISPARATE TREATMENT AMONGST STATES OF ARTICLE 20(2)
This Part will illustrate the vastly different ways that states
across the global community interpret Article 20(2).
60
First, it
will detail how some countries, namely the United States, prefer
their own free speech principles, as they allow freer expression
than under the ICCPR. In contrast, this Part will show how
56. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
57. See BUKOVSKA, supra note 9, at 1; see ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19; see
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20. In a draft version of General Comment No. 34 on
Article 19 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee said that:
Many forms of “hate speech” that, although a matter of con-
cern, do not meet the level of seriousness set out in [A]rticle
20. It also takes account of the many other forms of discrimi-
natory, derogatory and demeaning discourse. However, it is
only with regard to the specific forms of expression indicated
in [A]rticle 20 that States parties are obliged to have legal
prohibitions. In every other case, while the State is not pre-
cluded in general terms from having such prohibitions, it is
necessary to justify the prohibitions and their provisions in
strict conformity with [A]rticle 19.
BUKOVSKA, supra note 9. The final draft of General Comment No. 34 echoed
similar sentiments, saying that legislation prohibiting “displays of lack of re-
spect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are in-
compatible with the ICCPR, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in
article 20, paragraph 2.” See Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, supra note
50, ¶ 48.
58. The values enumerated in Article 19(3) are: (a) . . . the rights and repu-
tations of others, (b) . . . the protection of national security or of public order . .
. , or of public health or morals.” ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19.
59. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20; see Prohibition of Propaganda, supra
note 50; see Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, supra note 50, ¶ 51; see supra
text accompanying note 51.
60. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
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other countries, such as Ethiopia, abuse Article 20(2),
61
thus se-
riously infringing on the freedom of expression.
A. Purported Recognition in Countries with Traditionally Free
Speech Laws
The United States did not ratify the ICCPR until 1992, and
even then, the United States did so with many reservations, un-
derstandings and declarations (RUDs).
62
Many of these RUDs
were crafted to ensure that domestic law in the United States
would take precedence over its international obligations under
the ICCPR.
63
One reservation the United States made was to
Article 20.
64
The United States Senate, which ratified the
ICCPR, feared that this particular provision would interfere
with the freedom of speech right enshrined in the United States
61. See id.
62. See Kristina Ash, U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3
NW. J. INT’LHUM. RTS. 1, 2 (Spring 2005), http://scholarlycommons.law.north-
western.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=njihr. When the
United States was considering ratifying the ICCPR, it did so for two primary
reasons. See id. First, it wanted to affirm its commitment to human rights, and
further, it would allow the United States to be a part of the Human Rights
Committee which was established by the ICCPR to “monitor compliance.” Id.
Unfortunately, despite President Carter signing the document in 1977, there
was not enough political support in the United States Senate to vote in favor
of ratification. See id. at 3. The Senate Committee Report claimed that “domes-
tic and international events at the end of 1979 . . . prevented the Committee
from moving to a vote on the [ICCPR],” but it is also entirely possible that this
was just another failed attempt to ratify an international human rights treaty
after the Bricker Amendment proposal. Id. The Bricker Amendment, which
was proposed in the 1950’s in response to U.S. consideration of ratifying vari-
ous human rights treaties, sought to severely limit the power of international
agreements under the Constitution. Id. The Amendment never passed, but it
continued to affect U.S. foreign policy for some time. Id. Finally, in 1991, Pres-
ident H.W. Bush implored the Senate to reconsider ratifying the ICCPR, and
after drafting extensive RUD’s, the Senate voted for ratification of the docu-
ment. See id. Even so, it is worth noting that because of the unprecedented
number of RUD’s that the U.S. attached to ratification, the treaty was essen-
tially “rendered . . . powerless under domestic law.” See id. at 2²3.
63. See id. at 3.
64. See id. at 8; see ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20. The U.S. reservation to
Article 20 is: “That [A]rticle 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other
action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” See
id. at 8²9; Chapter IV Human Rights, supra note 47.
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Constitution under the First Amendment.
65
The United States
made a similar declaration regarding Article 19, stating that it
would “whenever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions
or limitations on the exercise of the rights recognized and pro-
tected by the [ICCPR], even when such restrictions are permis-
sible under the [ICCPR].”
66
Ultimately, the First Amendment does prevail in the United
States, protecting even the most egregious hate speech.
67
Unless
the advocacy in question is intended to incite imminent lawless
action, and is actually likely to do so, neither legislation nor law
enforcement can interfere.
68
This remains true no matter how
provocative or discriminatory the speech in question is.
69
Even
65. See Ash, supra note 62, at 9. The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
66. Ash, supra note 62, at 9 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted);
see ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19.
67. See Melissa Block, Comparing Hate Speech Laws in the U.S. and
Abroad, WNYC RADIO (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134239713/France-Isnt-The-Only-Country-To-
Prohibit-Hate-Speech. The First Amendment protected the Westboro Baptist
Church’s right to picket at military funerals toting signs that said, “God Hates
Fags.” Jan Wolfe, Factbox: When Can Free Speech be Restricted in the United
States?, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-virginia-
protests-speech-factbox/factbox-when-can-free-speech-be-restricted-in-the-
united-states-idUSKCN1AU2E0.
68. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); Jeff Howard, The ¶Bran-
denburg Test’ for Incitement to Violence, FREE SPEECH DEBATE,
http://freespeechdebate.com/case/the-brandenburg-test-for-incitement-to-vio-
lence/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). A civil rights activist who threatened that
blacks would “have their necks broken” if they did not participate in a boycott
of businesses owned by white persons was not liable for inciting violence.
Wolfe, supra note 67. Furthermore, simply carrying weapons, even firearms,
is not enough to rise to the level of inciting violence. Id. Carrying arms, using
force while yelling outside of a city hall building, and yelling that the govern-
ment was “damned racketeer[s]” and “damned Fascist[s],” however, rises to the
level of being likely to “provoke the average person to retaliation.” See Chap-
linsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571²72 (1942). “The lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ¶fighting’ words³those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite and immediate
breach of peace” all give rise to permissible speech limitations under the Con-
stitution. Id.
69. See Liptak, supra note 5. Indeed, in the United States, “mere advocacy
of violence, terrorism or the overthrow of the government is not enough; the
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false statements that generally increase scorn or generate fur-
ther discrimination towards a particular group will not be cen-
sored.
70
These high barriers to overcoming First Amendment
protections left the local government in Charlottesville, Virginia
largely powerless to protect citizens whenwhite nationalists and
counter-protestors clashed at a racially charged demonstration
in August 2017.
71
The city government granted the protestors a
permit to hold the rally, but when the city tried to obtain an or-
der to move the protest to another location further from down-
town due to mounting safety concerns, it was unable to do so.
72
A federal judge’s ruling sided with the protestors.
73
The judge
held that the city sought to move the protest not because of
safety concerns, but rather because of the anticipated content of
the speech³a would-be First Amendment violation.
74
Unfortu-
nately, safety concerns came to fruition that day. One woman
was killed at the demonstration and at least thirty-four people
were injured.
75
Two state troopers also diedmonitoring the event
from a helicopter that crashed.
76
Another unintended consequence of extensive First Amend-
ment protection is that the United States has created a place for
hate groups to disseminate messages over the Internet.
77
Such
groups are able to create websites based in the United States to
words must be meant to, and be likely to, produce violence or lawlessness right
away.” Id. (emphasis added).
70. See id.
71. SeeWolfe, supra note 67. Formore information about the Charlottesville
incident: see Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death,
WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-time-
line/?utm_term=.173fe54125f5; see Benjamin Hart & Chas Danner, 3 Dead
and Dozens Injured After Violent White-Nationalist Rally in Virginia, N.Y.
MAG (Aug. 13, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/08/state-of-
emergency-in-va-after-white-nationalist-rally.html; see Matt Stevens, White
Nationalists Reappear in Charlottesville in Torch-Lit Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/us/richard-spencer-char-
lottesville.html.
72. SeeWolfe, supra note 67.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. SeeMaggie Astor, Christina Caron &Daniel Victor, AGuide to the Char-
lottesville Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-virginia-overview.html.
76. See id.
77. See Block, supra note 67.
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circumvent stricter speech laws in their own countries and to
bring themselves within the ambit of First Amendment protec-
tion.
78
Some extremist groups have even used United States’
servers to carry out their anti-American agenda.
79
Indeed, intel-
ligence officers, as well as other private experts in the field, point
to “dozens of instances” that proponents of the Islamic State
looked to United States Internet firms to provide them with a
platform to “incite attacks on Americans.”
80
American Internet
firms are especially attractive because of the quality of service
and the fact that they allow users to remain anonymous, thereby
becoming a safe-haven for hate speech.
81
B. A Pattern of Abuse: Productive Democratic Speech Con-
demned as Incitement
The liberal free speech laws found in the United States are the
exception among the global community.
82
Other democratic
countries impose far heavier restrictions on expression than
does the United States.
83
For example, Germany, France and
Denmark have convicted citizens on charges of incitement that
likely do not rise to the meet the high standard for the offense
as envisaged by the ICCPR.
84
78. See id.
79. Joby Warrick & Candace Rondeaux, Taliban Using U.S. Firms to Host
Web Sites, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/08/AR2009040804378.html.
80. See id. “Militants’ use of U.S. Web hosts has sparked occasional spats
between the United States and its allies, as well as endless debates over
whether it is better to shut down the Web sites when they’re discovered or to
let them continue to operate.” Id. Arguably the most shocking instance of ex-
tremists using U.S. servers as a host was a Taliban website that shared content
globally, attempting to entice new followers and update existing followers
about “suicide bombings, rocket attacks and raids against U.S. and allied
troops.” Id. In this instance, the Texas firm that rented web space to the mili-
tant group for just about $70USD a month had no idea that this was a Taliban-
linked group. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Held Dear in U.S., Free Speech Perplexing Abroad, NAT’LPUB. RADIO
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/19/161439562/held-dear-in-u-s-
free-speech-perplexing-abroad.
83. See id.
84. See BUKOVSKA, supra note 9; see Held Dear in U.S., Free Speech Perplex-
ing Abroad, supra note 82. In these countries, “Holocaust denial is specifically
criminalized.” See id.While this type of speech is clearly “hurtful, offensive and
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There remains, however, a vast difference in enforcement of
incitement laws between countries who impose speech re-
strictions and countries who abuse freedom of expression provi-
sions in order to suppress speech. News headlines from countries
in many different parts of the world are fraught with stories
about opposition leaders being on trial for charges of incite-
ment.
85
In many of these cases, it is not difficult to see that the
criminal charges are part of a ploy to “misuse the criminal jus-
tice system to silence dissent.”
86
For example, a journalist con-
victed in Ethiopia for allegedly inciting violence against the
Ethiopian government faces up to ten years of imprisonment af-
ter a “groundless ruling.”
87
This move has been dubbed a “bid to
silence critics” by an international rights group.
88
As evidence,
this journalist was the Editor-in-Chief of Negere Ethiopia³a
magazine operated by a government opposition party, the
Semayawi Party.
89
To further prove the government’s intentions
to penalize any government critics and maintain uncontested
control, all 547 members of the Ethiopian parliament belong to
the same political party.
90
Minority dissident groups also claim
that the government is guilty of “constant harassment and in-
timidation.”
91
even in some cases inflammatory” it does rise to the high level that would ne-
cessitate prohibition under Article 20. BUKOVSKA, supra note 9; see ICCPR, su-
pra note 1, art. 20.
85. SeeBoureima Balima,Niger Opposition Leader to be Tried on Incitement
and Sedition Charges, REUTERS (May 18, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-niger-politics/niger-opposition-leader-to-be-tried-on-incitement-and-se-
dition-charges-idUSKCN18E34O; see Clement Uwiringiyimana, Rwanda
Charges Critic of President With Inciting Insurrection, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-politics/rwanda-charges-critic-of-
president-with-inciting-insurrection-idUSKCN1C915S; see Noah Browning,
UAE Arrests Prominent Activist for Incitement: State News, REUTERS (Mar. 21,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-activist/uae-arrests-prom-
inent-activist-for-incitement-state-news-idUSKBN16S0MC.
86. Maasho, supra note 6.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
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III. CHALLENGES IN REGULATING INCITING SPEECH
This Part will discuss two significant challenges to regulating
inciting speech.
92
First, courts, tribunals, United Nations com-
missions and other bodies have limited power to impose a stand-
ard for incitement. Rather, they can only influence the inception
of a universally accepted standard for incitement because there
is no authorized legislature in international law.
93
Second, the
widespread use of the Internet and other technologies that facil-
itate instant communication presents new challenges for regu-
lating inciting speech as hateful messages can reach mass audi-
ences in seconds.
94
C. Limitations on International Bodies Who Have Made, or May
Try to Make, a Statement Regarding a Standard for Incitement
This section assesses two prominent actors in international
law³the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the In-
ternational Law Commission (ILC)³in light of their potential to
effectively pronounce a threshold for incitement that other
states would follow.
95
Specifically, this section will discuss the
ECtHR and the ILC in terms of their influence on the global
community, as well as their limitations on the international
plane.
1. The European Court of Human Rights
In 1950, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
was one of the first signed instruments to give binding effect to
92. This Part does not purport to be exhaustive of all of the challenges in
regulating inciting speech.
93. N. N. Singh, The Absence of a Sovereign Legislature and Its Conse-
quences for International Law, 12 MALAYAL. REV. 277, 277 (1970), available at
https://hei-
nonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/sjls12&div=16&g_sent=1&casa_
token=&collection=journals.
94. James Banks, Regulating Hate Speech Online, 24 INT’L REV. L.,
COMPUTERS& TECH. 233, 234 (2010).
95. There are many other international law bodies that could be similarly
assessed in terms of their potential to successfully dictate a universal standard
for incitement. Even if two different actors were selected, the point remains
that while each body may have a certain sphere of influence, each also has a
number of limitations that would ultimately make it an ineffectual choice for
assessing the threshold for incitement.
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some of the rights expressed in the UDHR.
96
In 2006, the ECtHR
recognized that the ECHR deals with inciting speech vis-à-vis
the ECHR’s freedom of expression provision, even though the
document never officially uses any variation of the term “incite-
ment.”
97
The ECtHR explained that “it may be considered neces-
sary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent
all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote, or justify
hatred based on intolerance.”
98
Although the ECtHR has extended the ECHR to regulate in-
citement, incitement has not been adopted as a provision of the
ECHR.
99
As such, application of incitement laws to cases is
largely left to the prerogatives of the ECtHR.
100
Generally, the
ECtHR evaluates incitement in terms of hate speech. The EC-
tHR asks whether the speech in question rises to a level that
undermines the values expressed in the ECHR or whether it con-
stitutes hate speech, but will not likely pose a risk to the ECHR’s
values.
101
The ECtHR’s approach provides more of a framework
96. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. The ECHR pro-
tects basic human rights of all forty-seven state members of the Council of Eu-
rope³an organization founded after World War II to “protect human rights
and the rule of law, and to promote democracy.”What is the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights?, EQUALITY & HUM. RTS. COMM’N, https://www.equali-
tyhumanrights.com/en/what-european-convention-human-rights (last up-
dated Apr. 19, 2017). The European Court of Human Rights administers the
provisions of the ECHR. See id.
97. Hate Speech, EUR. CT. H.R. (June 2018), http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf. Under Article 10, the Freedom of Expres-
sion provision, free speech “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, re-
strictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a demo-
cratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the au-
thority and impartiality of the judiciary.” ECHR, supra note 96, art. 10.
98. Hate Speech, supra note 97.
99. See BUKOVSKA, supra note 9.
100. See id. at 6.
101. Hate Speech, supra note 97. “Human Rights, as they are put down in the
European Convention on Human Rights . . . cover basic rights and freedoms
like the right to life; the right to liberty and security; the right to a fair trial;
the right to freedom of thought, conscious and religion or the right to freedom
of expression. They also ban certain things like; torture; discrimination; slav-
ery and forced labour or punishment without law.” Core Values, EUR. HUM.
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for condemning inciting speech than did the UDHR.
102
It is, how-
ever, still too imprecise and inconsistent to be relied on as an
effective means of regulating inciting speech.
103
Furthermore,
the application of incitement laws in ECtHR cases is a secondary
consideration to the principles enumerated in the ECHR,
whereas regulation of speech likely to incite various evils de-
mands the full attention of the international community.
104
The ECtHR could, however, be an effective forum to consider
the proper threshold for prohibiting speech likely to incite dis-
crimination, hostility or violence.
105
Donna Artusy
106
explained
that
[a]lthough the [ECtHR] maintains jurisdiction over a smaller
number of states, it has a more significant influence over hu-
man rights protection than other courts, including the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the International Court of Justice, and
the International Criminal Court.
107
The primary reason is that the ECtHR allows individuals to
bring their own claims, rather than solely allowing states to ex-
ercise diplomatic protection on behalf of individuals.
108
As such,
Artusy concluded, the ECtHR “cover[s] a much wider range of
issues and consequently number of people.”
109
The ECtHR’s
breadth of relevant experience resulting from the large number
RTS. WATCHDOG, http://www.europewatchdog.info/en/council-of-europe/core-
values/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
102. Neither the ECHR nor the UDHR have specific provisions for incite-
ment, as discussed. The ECtHR adopted the concept of incitement through case
law, however, so it more directly addresses incitement than the UDHR.
103. See BUKOVSKA, supra note 9, at 6.
104. See id.
105. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
106. Artusy is a graduate of the Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service. Donna V. Artusy & David V. Gioe, Information Dominance Between
War and Peace: China as the ´Informationizedµ State, 31 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE
&COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 626 (Sept. 10, 2018).
107. Donna V. Artusy, The Evolution of Human Rights Law in Europe: Com-
paring the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ, ICJ, and ICC, 6
INQUIRIES J. 1, 1 (2014), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/936/the-evo-
lution-of-human-rights-law-in-europe-comparing-the-european-court-of-hu-
man-rights-and-the-ecj-icj-and-icc.
108. See id.
109. Id.
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of cases that come before it would prove useful in examining the
threshold for incitement.
110
In contrast, the major pitfall to the ECtHR’s potential effec-
tiveness as an arbiter of incitement is that its decisions are not
binding, even on ECHR signatories.
111
State signatories are sup-
posed to comply with the court’s verdicts, but the ECtHR has no
enforcement power.
112
Effecting global change, then, would be
difficult when the ECtHR lacks real authority over even its own
state signatories.
113
The coordination costs of implementing the
ECtHR’s suggestions worldwide would likely be too high.
114
2. The International Law Commission
The United Nations General Assembly established the ILC,
which hosted its first annual meeting in April 1949.
115
The ILC’s
objective, as stated in Article 1, paragraph 1 of the statute of the
ILC, is “the promotion of the progressive development of inter-
national law and its codification.”
116
This allows the ILC to ad-
dress new or emerging subjects of international law (“progres-
sive development”) and to particularize rules in areas where
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Profile: European Court of Human Rights, BBCNEWS (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16924514. Although there is no spe-
cific mechanism for enforcement, “members of the Council of Europe can be
expelled for ignoring judgments.” Artusy, supra note 107, at 3. The ECtHR has
yet to take advantage of this option to date. See id.
113. See Artusy, supra note 107, at 3.
114. See id. (“The European Court of Human Rights has been criticized as
having less impact because it does not hold power over asmany countries quan-
titatively«”).
115. About the Commission, Origin and Background: Drafting and Imple-
mentation of Article 13, Paragraph 1, INT’L L. COMM’N, http://le-
gal.un.org/ilc/drafting.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Drafting
and Implementation of Article 13, Paragraph 1].
116. About the Commission, Organization, Programme and Methods of Work:
Object of the Commission, INT’L L. COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/work.shtml
(last visited Oct. 1, 2018). This is similar to the purpose of the U.N. General
Assembly. Drafting and Implementation of Article 13, Paragraph 1, supra note
115. Under Article 13 of the United Nations Charter “[t]he General Assembly
shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: (1) . . .
encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codifica-
tion.” Id. In order to fulfill this purpose, the General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution establishing the Committee on the Progressive Development of Interna-
tional Law and its Codification, who, in turn, proposed the adoption of an in-
ternational law commission. Id.
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there is robust precedent (“codification”).
117
When considering an
issue, the ILC always enlists feedback from state governments
and from the United Nations General Assembly.
118
The ILC is arguably the best forum to make a statement re-
garding the proper threshold for incitement. In some instances,
the ILC’s reports have gained acceptance as pronouncements of
customary international law, and its work is often cited in the
dispute resolution process by international courts and tribu-
nals.
119
The suggestions that it collects from states when under-
taking to evaluate a new issue especially bolsters the ILC’s cred-
ibility.
120
The ILC, however, also has its limitations. One poten-
tial problem with the ILC assessing the threshold for the crimi-
nalization of inciting speech is the amount of time that it can
take the ILC to consider a single issue.
121
For example, the ILC
worked on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts for almost fifty years before it adopted a
final draft of the document.
122
117. See id. Once the ILC undertakes to evaluate a topic, they then generally
appoint a Special Rapporteur to develop the topic, including evaluating the
current state of the law, and to make suggestions when the time comes to draft
proposals to the General Assembly regarding the topic. See About the Commis-
sion, Organization, Programme and Methods of Work: Structure of the Com-
mission, INT’L L. COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/structure.shtml (last visited
Oct. 1, 2018). The plenary of the ILC then considers the work prepared by the
Special Rapporteur; and thereafter, the Drafting Committee is tasked with
“harmonizing the various viewpoints and working out generally acceptable so-
lutions.” Id. If the ILC approves the preliminary draft, it will be submitted to
the General Assembly as well as to governments for their consideration. See
About the Commission, Organization, Programme and Methods of Work: Meth-
ods of Work, INT’LL. COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/methods.shtml (last visited
Oct. 1, 2018). Any comments from either institution will be considered in pre-
paring the final draft proposal. See id.When a final proposal is completed, the
ILC can adopt their drafts in a number of ways including recommending the
adoption of a convention on the basis of their work or recommending the report
as a draft principal, guideline or conclusion. See id.
118. Aniruddha Rajput, International Law Commission and the Interna-
tional Legislative Process, INT’L L. SQUARE (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://ilsquare.org/2016/09/02/international-law-commission-and-the-inter-
national-legislative-process/comment-page-1/.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. James Crawford, Jacqueline Peel & Simon Olleson, The ILC’s Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion of the
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D. New Hurdles in the Age of the Internet
The ability to incite discrimination, hostility, or violence is not
limited to active, face-to-face solicitation of support to commit
heinous acts.
123
Today, the Internet facilitates the instant distri-
bution of print messages pictures, videos and more to over 4.2
billion people.
124
James Banks, Lecturer in Criminology and As-
sociate Researcher at Sheffield HallamUniversity, described the
Internet as the “new frontier for spreading hate.”
125
Indeed, the
Internet has provided hate groups with an “unprecedented
means of communicating and recruiting.”
126
Monitoring and prosecution, in particular, pose huge obstacles
to combating inciting speech on the Internet.
127
Traditional law
enforcement officials and techniques have difficulty grappling
with hate speech online because of the anonymity afforded by
the Internet, as well as the fact that the Internet is not confined
to state boarders.
128
In order to successfully deal with hate
speech online, law enforcement officials and prosecutors need
special Internet and cybersecurity training.
129
Ideally, this
would include establishing new law enforcement units tasked
specifically with regulating cyber-crime.
130
Such training and
implementation of new law-enforcement units is a useful tool in
combating hate speech online, but is not plausible in every coun-
try because of the high costs involved.
131
Second Reading, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, 963 (2001),
http://ejil.org/pdfs/12/5/1557.pdf.
123. Banks, supra note 94, at 234.
124. Internet Usage in the World by Regions, INTERNET WORLD STATS (June
30, 2018), http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.
125. Banks, supra note 94, at 234.
126. Peter J. Breckheimer II, A Haven for Hate: The Foreign and Domestic
Implications of Protecting Internet Hate Speech Under the First Amendment,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1493, 1497 (2002), http://www-
bcf.usc.edu/~usclrev/pdf/075603.pdf (internal citations omitted). “Don Black,
former Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan and author of the white-nationalist
Stormfront.org site, revels in the benefits the Internet has afforded hate organ-
izations such as his own. As the first to establish a site dedicated to intolerance
on the Internet, Black has noted that, ¶[a]s far as recruiting, [the Internet has]
been the biggest breakthrough I’ve seen in the 30 years I’ve been involved in
[white nationalism].’” Id.
127. See id.; see Hate on the Internet, supra note 14, at 5²6.
128. Banks, supra note 94, at 233.
129. Hate on the Internet, supra note 14, at 5.
130. See id. at 6.
131. See id.
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Cross-border differences present another challenge to regulat-
ing hate speech.
132
The Internet is a “global network” so interna-
tional cooperation is necessary to prosecute online hate crimes
that take place in one country, but target a person or group of
people in another country.
133
Thus, when countries have differ-
ent rules for regulating the Internet, it is nearly impossible to
dispose of online content that stems from one country, but that
affects another.
134
The United States, as aforementioned, has be-
come a targeted host country for radical online content because
of the formidable First Amendment protections.
135
For this rea-
son, the United States often presents problems for other coun-
tries attempting to regulate the Internet within their own board-
ers.
136
IV. EVALUATION OF ARTICLE 19’S PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED
SOLUTION
This Part explains the solution that ARTICLE 19 previously
proposed for assessing instances of incitement. This Part also
critiques ARTICLE 19’s solution, addressing whether it validly
reflects the intentions of Article 20(2)
137
and whether it provides
more or less clarity to states attempting to regulate the same.
A. ARTICLE 19’s Guidelines for Evaluating Incitement Cases
This section explains the general goals of the ARTICLE 19 so-
lution. It proceeds to addresses two key components of the solu-
tion: the definition of key terms related to incitement and the
six-part test for adjudicating incitement cases.
1. General Themes of ARTICLE 19’s Guidelines
ARTICLE 19 advocates for a “greater consensus” globally on
the criminalization of inciting speech.
138
In fact, ARTICLE 19’s
solution proposes that criminal sanctions should often not be
employed in incitement cases.
139
Rather, ARTICLE 19 advocates
132. See id. at 3.
133. Hate on the Internet, supra note 14, at 6; see also Banks, supra note 94,
at 235.
134. See Banks, supra note 94, at 235.
135. See infra Part II.A; see Block, supra note 67.
136. See Banks, supra note 94, at 234.
137. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
138. See Prohibiting Incitement, supra note 8, at 1.
139. See id.
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for creativity in sanctioning individuals spreading inciting mes-
sages through a variety of civil and administrative punish-
ments.
140
In addition, ARTICLE 19’s approach focuses on reme-
dial measures aimed at making reparations to the victims.
141
With these goals in mind, ARTICLE 19 sets forth a list of recom-
mendations it believes will help facilitate agreement on a thresh-
old for regulating inciting speech.
142
The suggestions are sup-
ported by “international standards” established by the UDHR,
the ICCPR, the ECHR, the American Convention on Human
Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights.
143
2. Defining Key Terms
ARTICLE 19 emphasizes the importance of defining key terms
relevant to the offense of incitement.
144
It provides actual defini-
tions of such words to be used under a specific methodology for
evaluating incitement cases.
145
For example, the word discrimi-
nation means:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, gender, ethnicity, religion or belief, disability, age, sexual
orientation, language political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, nationality, property, birth or other status, colour
which has the purpose of effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
146
ARTICLE 19 also identifies “hatred,” “discrimination,” “vio-
lence,” and “hostility” as words relevant to the offense of incite-
ment, and defines those terms as well.
147
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 19²27.
143. See id. at 9²17.
144. See id. at 19.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. The definition of hatred is: “a state of mind characterized as ¶in-
tense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards
the target group.’” See id. The definition of violence is: “the intentional use of
physical force or power against another person, or against a group or commu-
nity that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death,
psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.” See id. The definition of
hostility is: “a manifested action of an extreme state of mind. Although the
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3. ARTICLE 19’s Six-Part Test
ARTICLE 19 advances a six-part test for evaluating incite-
ment cases.
148
It urges that analyzing incitement cases under its
six-part test will standardize jurisprudence on incitement of-
fenses.
149
ARTICLE 19 reasons that its test provides courts with
a “framework” to assess incitement on a case-by-case basis.
150
ARTICLE 19 proceeds to provide pertinent considerations with
regard to each element of the test.
151
For example, under the first
part of the test, “context,” ARTICLE 19 implores courts to con-
sider the “existence of conflicts within society,” the “existence
and history of institutionalized discrimination,” the “history of
clashes and conflicts,” “the legal framework” and “the media
landscape.”
152
B. A Critique of ARTICLE 19’s Solution
This section critiques the ARTICLE 19 solution. First, it ad-
dresses problems with the proposed definitions, including, inter
alia, ARTICLE 19’s methodology for defining the terms. It then
critiques the six-part test, which further confuses the threshold
for incitement rather than clarifying it.
term implies a state of mind, an action is required. Hence, hostility can be de-
fined as the manifestation of hatred.” See id.
148. See Prohibiting Incitement, supra note 8, at 27. As stated in the Intro-
duction, ARTICLE 19 proposes that states consider all of the following ele-
ments when adjudicating incitement cases: “(1) context of the expression; (2)
speaker/proponent of the expression; (3) intent of the speaker/proponent of the
expression to incite to discrimination, hostility or violence; (4) content of the
expression; (5) extent and magnitude of the expression (including its public
nature, its audience and means of dissemination); [and] (6) likelihood of the
advocated action occurring, including its imminence.” Id. All of these elements,
they say, should be strictly assessed. See id. at 2.
149. See id. at 27, 29.
150. See id. at 27, 29.
151. See id. at 29²40.
152. See id. at 29²30.
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1. Problems with Article 19’s Proposed Definitions
There are two preeminent problems with the definitions used
by ARTICLE 19.
153
First, the ARTICLE 19 definitions lead Arti-
cle 20(2)
154
away from being a standard to guide the interna-
tional community and dangerously towards a strict rule.
155
Sec-
ond, ARTICLE 19 took the proposed definitions from various in-
ternational sources.
156
This solution is inappropriate for a myr-
iad of reasons, the chief concern as a matter of international law
being that this assumes state consent.
157
ARTICLE 19’s recom-
mendations, which impose definitions conceived for other docu-
ments, ignore the legislative history of Article 20(2), thereby de-
fying the intentions of the state parties who drafted it.
158
ARTICLE 19’s proposed expansion of the protected groups by
making the current list “non-exhaustive”
159
suffers the same
problem since Article 20(2) only focuses on “any advocacy of na-
tional, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement.”
160
The drafting of Article 20(2) was highly contentious among
states.
161
Supporters of this provision argued that individuals
153. See Prohibiting Incitement, supra note 8, at 19.
154. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
155. See infra Part V.A for further discussion on standards versus rules, and
the dangerous pitfalls of the latter with regard to regulating inciting speech.
156. See Prohibiting Incitement, supra note 8, at 19. The definitions for the
terms hatred and hostility are both taken from the Camden Principles of Free-
dom of Expression and Equality. See id. The meaning of discrimination was
adapted from those set forth in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See id. Finally, the definition of violence is
adapted from one offered by the World Health Organisation in their 2002 re-
port, World Report on Violence and Health. See id.
157. See generally Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters- Non-
State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137 (2005), available at https://scholarship.law.berke-
ley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1283&context=bjil. “Only if all concerned
parties consent, whether by treaty, adjudication, or arbitration, does an actual
determination of the legal norm, at least with respect to those parties, become
possible.” See id. at 144.
158. SeeMona Elbahtimy, The Right to be Free from the Harm of Hate Speech
in International Human Rights Law 1, 9 (U. of Cambridge, Working Paper No.
7, 2014), https://www.free-expression.group.cam.ac.uk/pdfs/elbahtimy.
159. See Prohibiting Incitement, supra note 8, at 19²21.
160. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
161. See Elbahtimy, supra note 158, at 10.
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would abuse their right to exercise expression freely.
162
Oppo-
nents feared that states would abuse the incitement provision
by putting too many limitations on expression.
163
Toby Mendel,
Executive Director at the Center for Law and Democracy,
164
ex-
plained that because of the disagreement between states,
“[p]roposals to restrict Article 20(2) to incitement to violence
were rejected, but so were proposals to extend it, for example to
include ¶racial exclusiveness’, on the basis of concern about free
speech.”
165
The article was eventually adopted, but conflicting
opinions about its contents persisted.
166
Fifty states voted in fa-
vor of enactment, while eighteen voted against and fifteen states
abstained from voting.
167
Since the inception of the ICCPR, the
Human Rights Committee³the United Nations organ responsi-
ble for interpreting the ICCPR³has abstained from revisiting
the provision prohibiting incitement, including leaving key
terms, such as “hatred,” “hostility” and “incitement,” undefined
in Article 20(2).
168
The serious disagreement at the time of draft-
ing the incitement provision indicates that the state parties did
not intend to strictly define key terms in Article 20(2), as sug-
gested by ARTICLE 19. Nor did they intend to expand the scope
of the incitement provision, as further urged by ARTICLE 19.
The subsequent failure of the Human Rights Committee to ad-
dress these issues not only reinforces the state’s intentions at
the time the ICCPR entered into force, but also suggests that the
provision is supposed to remain the way that it was drafted.
2. Problems with ARTICLE 19’s Six-Part Test
The ARTICLE 19 framework for evaluating incitement cases
is problematic because it broadens the scope of Article 20(2),
169
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. Who We Are, CENTRE L. & DEMOCRACY, https://www.law-democ-
racy.org/live/about-us/who-we-are/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
165. Toby Mendel, Hate Speech Rules Under International Law 1, 3, CENTRE
L. & DEMOCRACY (Feb. 2010), http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2010/07/10.02.hate-speech.Macedonia-book.pdf.
166. See Elbahtimy, supra note 158, at 10.
167. See id.
168. See id.; see infra Part V for further discussion on this point.
169. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
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which, as discussed,
170
is contrary to the intentions of the draft-
ers of the provision.
171
Furthermore, this will likely exacerbate
the problem of divergent interpretations of the article not only
among states, but within states as well. ARTICLE 19 proposes
its own six-part test for evaluating incitement cases; however,
ARTICLE 19 also emphasizes the importance of complying with
the three-part test laid out in Article 19(3).
172
As discussed, lim-
itations on expression under Article 19(3) must be provided by
law, must pursue a legitimate aim, and must be necessary in a
democratic society.
173
This test is different than the additional
test that ARTICLE 19 conceived of, yet the organization pro-
vides no suggestions for how to reconcile the two methods.
ARTICLE 19 seemingly wants courts to consider incitement
cases under the test it has laid out and to then consider whether
they also comply with the test under Article 19(3).
174
With so
many considerations for each prong of the test, any judge could
easily make a case fit into the ARTICLE 19 framework.
V. SOLUTION
This Part proposes that the best way to evaluate incitement
cases is by applying a standard that allows decision-makers to
make fact-centric determinations concerning whether a case
truly reaches the level of incitement. This Part further argues
that by attempting to understand incitement in light of Article
19(3) of the ICCPR, as envisioned by the drafters, there already
is a standard in place for evaluating these cases. The final step
towards realizing a universal threshold, therefore, is a concerted
effort by states to interpret the standard and apply it uniformly.
A. Realizing Advantages of a Flexible Standard in Lieu of a
Strict Rule
Rules and standards, in general, are both imperfect methods
for grappling with different legal issues.
175
The disadvantages of
170. See supra Part IV.B.1.
171. See Elbahtimy, supra note 158, at 9²10.
172. See Prohibiting Incitement, supra note 8, at 41; see ICCPR, supra note
1, art. 19.
173. See supra Part I.B.3.
174. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19.
175. See Rules Versus Standards (Public Choice), WHAT-WHEN-HOW,
http://what-when-how.com/public-choice/rules-versus-standards-public-
choice/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Rules Versus Standards].
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rules compared to the advantages of standards, however, make
a standard the better method for grappling with incitement
cases.
176
Rules are inflexible.
177
While rules provide clear tests,
they effectively prevent adjudicators from considering the
unique circumstances of each dispute before reaching a deci-
sion.
178
In contrast, standards facilitate fact-centric determina-
tions because they are, to a degree, “open-ended.”
179
The evaluation of expression demands a fact-specific determi-
nation. Consider, for example, the publicized photo shoot depict-
ing American comedian, Kathy Griffin, purporting to hold the
excised head of current United States President, Donald
Trump.
180
The public response to the stunt was overwhelmingly
negative, and Griffin was fired from her position as the co-host
of CNN’s live New Year’s Eve Show.
181
Squatty Potty³a toilet
footstool company³also suspended advertisements starring
Griffin.
182
Griffin’s stunt, however, was not a true threat to Pres-
ident Trump,
183
and it would be unimaginable to see her crimi-
nalized for these actions. Indeed, one of the foundational free ex-
pression cases,Handyside v. the United Kingdom, decided by the
ECtHR, emphasizes that freedom of expression applies “not only
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Melissa Chan, ¶He Broke Me.’ Kathy Griffin Says Trump Family Ruined
Her Life Over Controversial Photo, TIME (June 2, 2017),
http://time.com/4803225/kathy-griffin-trump-photo-head/. The following arti-
cles present more information about the Kathy Griffin stunt: Andrea Mandell,
CNN Fires Kathy Griffin Over Offensive Donald Trump Photo, USA TODAY
(May 31, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2017/05/31/cnn-
fires-kathy-griffin-over-offensive-trump-photo/102349176/; Randy Cordova,
Anderson Cooper Hopes Kathy Griffin ¶Bounces Back’ From Photo, USA TODAY
(June 10, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2017/06/10/anderson-cooper-kathy-griffin-trump/386393001/; Andrea
Mandell, Kathy Griffin Isn’t Sorry About Her Trump Photo Anymore, USA
TODAY (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/peo-
ple/2017/08/29/kathy-griffin-isnt-sorry-her-trump-photo-anymore/614332001/;
Chancellor Agard, Kathy Griffin Bloody Trump Pic Defended by Photographer,
ENT. WKLY. (May 30, 2017), http://ew.com/news/2017/05/30/kathy-griffin-
trump-head-photo-tyler-shields/.
181. See Chan, supra note 180.
182. See id.
183. See id.
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to ¶information’ or ¶ideas’ that are favourably received or re-
garded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population.”
184
Conversely, had the same photographs been taken by a known,
anti-American terrorist, the threat of the photographs would be
more serious. This is the type of expression that the prohibition
on incitement endeavors to criminalize.
185
Even though the ex-
pression in both cases was the same, the facts dictate the need
to criminalize the expression or not.
186
A rule would disallow this
type of judgment call, while a standard facilitates a discretion-
ary ruling on this issue.
187
To be sure, standards also facilitate inconsistency to an ex-
tent.
188
Considering facts in cases of criminalizing incitement,
however, is so crucial that it takes primacy over consistency,
which can be dealt with in other ways. Namely, a concerted ef-
fort by states, which is necessary regardless, can and will be the
only way to truly overcome problems regarding inconsistency. In
addition, standards are known for being more difficult to inter-
pret for people trying to regulate their conduct, as compared to
rules, which clearly set out what conduct is prohibited thereun-
der.
189
Here, though, it is clear when speech is intentionally and
inherently hostile or violent towards a person or group of people;
so any notion that a person could not foresee the consequences
of spreading hateful content is meritless.
B. Accepting the True Intentions of Article 20(2)
190
Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right.
191
The
ICCPR embodies this concept, and implores states to respect
it.
192
The right to freedom of expression, which is enshrined in
184. Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737,
¶ 49 (1976) (emphasis added).
185. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
186. See Rules Versus Standards, supra note 175.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
191. See Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, supra note 50, ¶ 2.
192. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19; see generally Freedoms of Opinion and Ex-
pression, supra note 50.
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Article 19, involves both the right to share and to consume infor-
mation and opinions.
193
This right, however, is not absolute, and
the prohibitions of Article 20(2) are one of the few permissible
limitations on freedom of expression.
194
Even speech likely to in-
cite discrimination, hostility or violence, however, must comply
with the three-part test from Article 19(3).
195
Indeed, this three-
part test is the standard by which incitement cases should be
evaluated; the onus is ultimately on the courts to apply this
standard in a way that effectuates the purpose of Article 20(2),
196
including respecting the free speech principles that are sacred
under the ICCPR.
197
C. Isolating Inappropriate Instances of Incitement
Since a standard for incitement already exists, the true chal-
lenge to achieving uniform practice by states regarding a thresh-
old for criminalizing inciting speech is for courts to interpret the
contents of Article 19(3).
198
Surveying past instances of criminal-
ization of incitement would be an effective tool to determine the
appropriate threshold under Article 20(2).
199
Ruling out inappro-
priate instances of incitement and publicizing the same would,
in particular, be very instructive to states. One possible method
for beginning to interpret the standard under Article 19(3) would
be to survey prior cases considered by various international
courts and tribunals regarding expression under either Article
19(3) or Article 20(2).
200
Many ECtHR decisions refer specifically
to the three-part test enshrined in Article 19(3),
201
and proffer
detailed reasoning for why cases meet or do not meet one or all
of the three prongs.
202
193. See id.
194. See infra Part I.B.3.
195. See id.
196. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
197. See id.; See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19.
198. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19. Recall that the three-part test under
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR dictates that any restrictions on expression³even
those cases that fall under Article 20(2)³must be provided by law, must pur-
sue a legitimate aim, and must be necessary in a democratic society. See Free-
doms of Opinion and Expression, supra note 50, ¶ 22.
199. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
200. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19; see also ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
201. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19.
202. All international courts and tribunals should be taken into account in
order to determine a threshold that is representative of all parts of the world.
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CONCLUSION
States have incorrectly dealt with instances of speech likely to
incite discrimination, hostility or violence for too long. Provi-
sions prohibiting incitement are essential to protect individual
rights and communities, so the international community needs
to prioritize correct application of Article 20(2)’s mandate. Re-
gardless of who undertakes to evaluate the issue of prohibiting
speech likely to incite discrimination, hostility or violence,
203
there are certain analytical steps necessary to determine a
threshold that is both accurate in light of the intentions of Arti-
cle 20(2)
204
and viable on the universal stage. Viability depends
on the advancement of a standard, which will be necessarily flex-
ible in order to withstand the test of time, to guide the interna-
tional community. Such a standard is preferable to a strict rule
that will allow states to continue to abuse the criminalization of
inciting speech. This is what application of the ARTICLE 19
framework will facilitate³continued abuse. With too many con-
siderations to balance, courts can more easily classify an in-
stance of expression as incitement. Moreover, the ARTICLE 19
framework is unnecessary because a viable standard for regulat-
ing incitement already exists. The three-part test under Article
19(3)
205
is supposed to guide states adjudicating incitement
cases.
206
The true challenge then, is for states to apply the exist-
ing standard consistently. States can only overcome this chal-
lenge through a concerted effort to understand the appropriate
This note merely advocates that the ECtHR is a good place to start because of
the vast number of cases that they have considered regarding expression under
the ICCPR, and the clear language used in the decisions that specifically ref-
erences the three-part test. The following cases are examples of ECtHR deci-
sions that address whether restrictions on expression are provided by law:
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245
(1979); Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14
(1984); Müller v. Switzerland, App. No. 10737/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (1988).
The following case is an example of a ECtHR decision that addresses whether
restrictions on expression pursue a legitimate aim: Ū.A. v. Turkey, App. No.
42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). The following cases are examples of ECtHR
decisions that address whether restrictions on expression are necessary in a
democratic society: Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4), App. No. 24762/94, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1999); Castells v. Spain, App. No. 11798/85, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 445 (1992);
CumpĆnĆ v. Romania, App. No. 33348/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (2004).
203. See infra Part III.A.
204. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20.
205. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19.
206. See infra Part I.B.3.
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bounds of Article 19(3).
207
Of course, this type of in-depth survey
of decades or more of case law is no simple feat. The problems
regarding inconsistent application of criminal incitement, in-
cluding both over-criminalization and under-criminalization of
expression, however, are crucial and demand this type of effort
by states.
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